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Why is breath invisible? 
Nothing is so much taken for granted as breath, the literal source of our life-blood.  Its 
importance and pervasiveness across the scales at which bodies interact with the materials, 
cultures, and politics of life is perhaps a key reason for this.  So entangled is breath in 
everything bodies are, experience and do that it gets taken for granted, lost from view and is 
rarely a direct focus of attention.  Putting breath under the spotlight is, therefore, a daunting 
task.  Attempting to unravel it from the mesh of significance which it has generated is 
challenging, but recognising its centrality at the outset is critical.  What the cultural theorist, 
Steven Connor, has written of the air could so easily be said of breath:  
 
How does one study an object that is everywhere? […] To study an object, one must 
pick it out from its surroundings, and concentrate it in one place.  How was one to 
make of the air such an object?  How was the air to be picked out of its surroundings, 
when air was ambience itself?  How was the air to be brought before one when it 
was of necessity and at all times all about? (Connor, 2010) 
 
 
‘Picking breath out from its surroundings’ is part of the task of this article, and I do this by 
arguing for the importance of breath as a focus for body studies.  My task is made easier by 
focusing on situations where breath is a problem.  Breath is not invisible to those for whom 
breathing is difficult, but their situation brings particular kinds of absence and isolation 
which are complex to address.  The inability to breathe silences people, and polluted air 
shuts those with breathing difficulties more firmly behind the protection of closed doors, 
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unseen and ignored by society.  Invisibility is not, of course, the same as absence.  Those 
whose breath is relatively absent feel invisible, and may even make themselves invisible 
because of a sense of shame at their condition.  It is not that breath is invisible – it is going 
on within and around us all the time - but from many perspectives it may appear to be so.   
 
I will open out some perspectives on breath through Scheper-Hughes and Lock’s three 
perspectives on the body, the ‘phenomenologically experienced body-self’, the social body 
focusing on ‘relationships among nature, society and culture’, and the ‘body politic, an 
artefact of social and political control’ (Scheper-Hughes and Lock, 1987).  This approach 
offers a framework which structures an examination of the felt sense of being in a body that 
breathes or has difficulty breathing; how breath enables (or lack of it disables) interactions in 
the social sphere.  I shall also examine other perspectives I consider somewhat underplayed 
in Scheper-Hughes and Lock’s account, mainly the ways particular cultures (clinical and 
literary) write about breath, the words they use and how this shapes experience of 
breathlessness.  Having laid some groundwork to establish breath’s invisibility in a range 
contexts and sites, I will go on to justify breath as an important emergent topic in the field of 
body studies.  Breathing occupies an important space as a lens through which to understand 
the body, as a bodily function essential to the maintenance of life but one that, unlike the 
heartbeat, we can interrupt and control at will.  The exploration of breath, therefore, speaks 
to key themes of importance to this journal: the distinction between objective biomedical 
measures and subjective individual perception of bodily sensations; and relationships 
between cognition, affect and interoceptive awareness (Paterson, 2019). 
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The research on which this article is based took place through the Life of Breath, a project 
characterised by interdisciplinary entanglement between humanities, social and clinical 
science researchers and ‘experts by experience’ (i.e. those living with breathlessness) 
articulating new questions and finding practical solutions to some of the problems 
identified.1  The disciplines involved in the project included philosophy, literary studies, 
history, anthropology, clinical medicine, neuroscience and a range of art forms, including 
visual art, dance and music.  ‘Entanglement’ implies that the relationships between these 
disciplines are not just connections but in-depth conversations involving mutual 
understandings of the several ontologies and epistemologies involved.  For example, pairing 
a philosopher trained in phenomenology with a phenomenologically-minded anthropologist 
ensured that the field-work investigations of the experience of breathlessness went further 
than questions like: ‘can you get up stairs?’, or ‘how does the weather affect your 
breathing?’.  As I will demonstrate later in this article, engaging with clinical neuroscientists 
alerted us to new research on interoceptive awareness and the problems that might result 
from lack of such embodied awareness in people with breathlessness.  
 
In common with previous contributions in this journal, the active term ‘entanglement’ also 
signals an approach to the body as a dynamic entity, ‘co-exist [ing] in shared ecologies’ 
(Blackman, 2010); co-existing and also co-evolving and co-responding.  We have termed our 
approach ‘critical medical humanities’.  Critical medical humanities champions 
transdisciplinary methodologies in attempting to understand health and illness, and desires 
to share findings and create new approaches that will enable knowledge of contextualised 
experience to influence the health-care evidence base (Viney, Callard and Woods, 2015).  
What distinguishes the critical medical humanities’ approach is the integration of disciplines 
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and methods, but also the emphasis on the groundedness of experience in local histories 
and the cultural record.  This article, in common with the methods of critical medical 
humanities, draws upon a range of readings, analyses and some empirical work undertaken 
by members of the project team.  
 
In attempting to bring breath into visibility I will treat it severally as sensation, means of 
interaction, political battleground and metaphor.  Taking a critical medical humanities 
approach, I will demonstrate how the poverty of narrative accounts and language for breath 
outside healthcare contexts have allowed clinically mediated interpretations of the 
breathless body to dominate.  I will explore this problem with reference to Latour’s concept 
of ‘articulation’ which acknowledges the importance of both objective and subjective 
perspectives in understanding the lived body (Latour, 2004), and how this is demonstrated 
through the notion of interoceptive awareness.  I hope to illustrate how richly rewarding the 
topics of breath and breathlessness are for body studies, and their importance for 
developing further theoretical insights and practical solutions for those with breathlessness.  
This special issue is a key step in making breath such an emergent topic.   
 
Breath and the lived body 
At the outset it is important to say what kind of a thing we are dealing with, and this is not 
easy to articulate.  In a clinical sense breathing, or respiration, is a physiological process 
involving the inspiration of oxygen and the expiration of carbon dioxide.  Breath, therefore, 
consists of a collection of gases, variously constituted depending on the point in the 
respiratory cycle.  For breathers, however, breath is more complex in its meanings than this, 
signaling as it does the presence and the passing of life; and the expression of emotion in 
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gasps and sighs.  It cannot really be captured in a moment, as a thing with a static existence, 
as it is constantly in flux, impermanent, continually changing its shape and character 
depending at what point in the process you happen to observe it.  Breath can therefore be 
difficult to articulate or explain, but is central to the functioning of our bodies under both 
conscious and unconscious control.  
 
This problem of articulation is one reason why knowledge of breath as a sensation is difficult 
to pin down.  Breath is normally brought into awareness as a sensory phenomenon.  
Following Drew Leder’s approach we might think of the first-hand experience of breath as 
interoceptive (Leder, 1990, p. 39).  Leder distinguishes three modalities of bodily sensation: 
interoception, which refers to sensing the internal activities of the body; exteroception, 
meaning the working of the five senses taking in the external world; and prioprioception, 
providing information on the position of the body in space.   
 
Leder’s key example of interoceptive awareness is of the gastrointestinal tract ingesting an 
apple.  Applying his method to the conscious awareness of breath might go something like 
this.  When we inhale consciously, paying attention to our breathing rather than leaving 
control to the autonomic system, we may be aware of the flow of air passing over our lips 
and tongue and flowing into our trachea.  We cannot feel the flow of the air against the lung 
parenchyma, but we may be aware of the cold or heat of the packet of air we have just 
inhaled, and we can feel our chest stretching and expanding to a greater or lesser extent, 
then contracting as the whole process is reversed.  Walking down a busy traffic-filled street 
there may also be the taste of polluted air in the mouth or a slight catch as the trachea 
attempts to filter dirt out from the air.  We may also be aware of the expansion of the 
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abdomen as the diaphragm contracts in inspiration and relaxes as we breathe out.  In 
breathlessness, the process is rather taken out of our hands, with the autonomic system 
taking over to ensure the oxygen debt is repaid after running or exerting ourselves.  In the 
case of a person with breathing problems, other parts of the physiological system are called 
into play through so-called accessory muscles, such as those of the neck.  These may add an 
additional sensory experience to the exertion and work of these muscles supporting the 
chest wall in its bellows-like action. 
 
Of course, most of the time breathing is in the background – it is invisible to the sensing 
body – but uniquely amongst internal viscera, the lungs are not part of what Leder terms the 
‘recessive body’ (p. 53), that is the body outside our conscious influence.  We can take over 
control of our breathing, slowing it down, deepening it, even stopping it for a while.  This 
control is essential for the activities of normal living, such as eating, speaking, coughing or 
sniffing, or specialist activities like singing, playing a musical instrument, or freediving.  The 
operations of conscious control add considerable complexity to what might determine the 
experience of breathlessness in normal and pathological states, rendering thoughts and 
feelings potentially much more influential. 
 
First person experience of breath and breathing is, then, deeply imbricated with aspects of 
the invisible: breathing being the function of hidden organs, sensed only in the movement of 
air through mouth and trachea, and only if part of conscious focus.  The experience of breath 
and breathlessness are key sites of analysis for understanding the phenomenological notion 
of the  ‘lived body’ (Leder, 1990, p. 7) because these sensations are under both conscious 
and unconscious control and slip in and out of awareness depending on context.  Inspired by 
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the writings of Merleau-Ponty, Leder sees the ‘lived body’ as an attempt to ‘escape from 
cognitive habits of dualism deeply entrenched in our culture’ (p. 5).  While our fleshly 
material first perceives the world, it recedes into the background as cognition and 
interpretation take over: ‘I am not in front of my body, I am in it, or rather I am it’ (Merleau-
Ponty, 1962, p. 173).  While proposing the foundational importance of the body as perceiver 
of the world, and the primacy of subjective experience, Leder also insists that the lived body 
involves a ‘third-person’ perspective, including the body ‘articulated by science as well as the 
life-world gaze’ (Leder, 1990, p. 7).  Breathlessness is also subject to this ‘third person’ 
perspective being observable and measurable by clinical technology, but also inscrutable 
since objective measures do not equate with lived experience.   
 
This point is critical to what I will argue is the place of breath in body studies.  Breath as 
sensory experience is difficult to explain; and in relation to the symptom of breathlessness, 
scientific explanations have become the dominant way of articulating the sensation.  This 
has led to problems of so called ‘symptom discordance’ where the felt experience of 
breathlessness does not equate with clinically measured lung function (Herigstad et al, 
2011).  I will return to this theme in the final section of the article in attempting to close the 
gap between these disaggregated first and third person perspectives incorporating some 
recent insights offered by research on interoceptive awareness into the dynamic interactions 
between body and world.   
 
 
Breath and the social body 
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As well as a first person encounter with one’s own body, breathing is also a social 
phenomenon, and is experienced, and perhaps brought into greatest awareness, through 
interaction with others.  These are often conscious activities dependent on breath, such as 
speaking, sighing, gasping and other expressions of emotion.  Lande (2007) looks at how the 
socialisation of army recruits is consciously mediated by breath.  According to Lande, 
breathing ‘properly’ is a necessary prerequisite for running in a pack, firing a rifle and even 
exerting authority: ‘it doesn’t look good as a leader if you are huffing it at the rear’ (Lande, p. 
100).  Breathing is the activity that ‘coordinates bodies-in-time’; it is what signifies the 
‘experience of the “We”’(Lande, 2007).  That universally shared experience of breathing, 
therefore, creates a common bond that we are often not aware of unless it is brought into 
visibility by activities that command attention, such as conversation or running in a pack 
(Lande, 2007).   
 
Exclusion from that shared community of healthy breathers, when breathing becomes 
dysfunctional, can be an isolating experience.  For those with breathing problems, social life 
is likewise difficult (Nicholls, 2003).  Their breathing takes its own pattern and may be 
unpredictable and impossible to co-ordinate with that of others.  Research on the Life of 
Breath project with British Lung Foundation ‘Breathe Easy’ support groups has reported 
some of the kinds of arrangements group members make to avoid the embarrassment of 
being out of breath in the company of friends.  Contrary to expectation, one group member 
reported that she does not accept lifts to social events, preferring to get herself to a venue 
in plenty of time to recover her breath before to greeting friends.  It is common for people 
with breathlessness to avoid walking along the street accompanied as they find it difficult to 
walk and talk at the same time.  Others reported using the street tactic of pretending to look 
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in shop windows or use a mobile phone to recover their breath.   The invisibility theme is 
particularly acute in this context because breathlessness (except in the most severely 
breathless) only becomes visible on exertion.  One group member with pulmonary fibrosis 
remembered being told by an acquaintance: ‘you are looking really well’, and responding, ‘I 
am actually awaiting a lung transplant’.  Another spoke of getting ugly looks from passers-by 
when parking his car in a disabled parking space, as it was only when he started to walk that 
his problem became apparent.  As McGuire and Carel note, people living with breathlessness 
have a paradoxical attitude to its visibility.  On the one hand there is a desire to hide their 
problem for complex reasons associated with wanting to appear ‘normal’ in social contexts; 
on the other, there is resentment when people are unaware of it, because of its invisibility at 
rest (McGuire and Carel, 2019).   
 
Breath is, therefore, an important mediator of social interactions.  It is a shared, taken for 
granted, common denominator that connects people through the exchange of words and 
breath itself.  In its absence, coordinated and in-common social life can become fractured 
because breath and words are not possible.  The physiological and emotional rationale for 
this fracturing is only one element, however, and in the next section I will consider the 
interactions of politics and problematic breathing.   
 
The breathless ‘body politic’  
Breathless people are among the most marginalised in western societies and one reason for 
this it that breathlessness disproportionally affects the most disadvantaged communities.  A 
report by the British Lung Foundation (BLF) on the impact of lung disease in the UK (BLF, 
2016) demonstrates the clear relationship between common lung diseases and 
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socioecomonic status.  Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) is currently the fourth 
and soon to become the third most common cause of death in developed countries 
(Mathers and Loncar, 2006), and those living in the most socially deprived areas are more 
than two and a half times more likely than those in more affluent areas to develop the 
condition.  Key reasons for this include smoking, which has a much higher prevalence in 
disadvantaged communities (Stringhini et al, 2010) and amongst certain groups marginalised 
by ethnicity and gender (Millward and Karlsen, 2011).  Other influences also include outdoor 
air pollution.  This much publicised global problem, highest in socio-economically deprived 
parts of cities like Delhi and London, contributes to the development or exacerbation of lung 
disease especially in the more vulnerable elderly and children (Marmot, 2010).  
 
Partly as a consequence, it is uncommon to see someone out on the street struggling and 
having to stop to catch their breath, or walking along with an oxygen tank.  The 
marginalization that comes from socioeconomic status is compounded by physical difficulty, 
but also by the fact that people with lung disease are often ashamed of their condition and 
do not wish to be seen.  The word ‘invisible’ is a recurrent feature in articles describing the 
experience of breathless people.  An article about people who suffer from COPD entitled, 
‘The invisibility of breathlessness’, shows how breathlessness is seen as ‘shameful’ and 
‘embarrassing’, as self-inflicted because of smoking or though failing to preserve fitness as in 
later life (Gysels and Higginson, 2008).  The BLF’s 2007 report on COPD in the UK was 
likewise entitled ‘Invisible Lives’ (BLF, 2007).  The report noted that individuals may feel 
invisible but there is also a problem of the so-called ‘missing millions’: the estimated almost 
3 million people who suffer from COPD but do not seek a diagnosis because they do not 
recognise they have a lung problem.  This lack of awareness is more profound in areas of 
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social deprivation.  People tend to accept the slow deterioration and chronic cough 
associated with conditions such as COPD as their lot, and do not present to health 
professionals.  Even when they do see their GP and are offered support, the perception that 
they are ‘unworthy’, may contribute to lack of uptake of management options such as 
pulmonary rehabilitation (Harrison et al., 2014).  
The often ill-informed perspectives of others on breathless people are important 
determinants of their invisibility in society.  Dolezal, writing on the subject of shame, reflects 
on Sartre’s account of the ‘Look’, which ‘arises when one embodied subjectivity encounters 
another’ (Dolezal, 2016 p. 30).  Dolezal’s point is that in encountering others, we see 
ourselves through their eyes as Sartre puts it (Sartre, 1958; 2003 p, 329).  The content of 
that ‘being seen’ is influenced by how society views aspects of ourselves that we feel may be 
stigmatised, such as body size, age, gender, and also breathlessness.   
 
The marginalisation of those who find breathing difficult is compounded by the invisibility of 
research funding.  Research on cardiac disease and non-respiratory cancers receives around 
ten times the funding for lung disease.  This has consequences for mortality, which for heart 
disease has declined by 15% over the last decade in the UK, while lung disease has remained 
static (BLF, 2016).   
 
What is apparent from my ‘three bodies’ account of breath and breathlessness is that the 
way society views people with breathlessness is dominated by a health-related narrative.  
We recognise that being out of breath is not entirely a function of illness, but can be 
associated with fitness and strength.   However, the achievements of athletes are rarely 
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celebrated in terms of breath, but rather by admiration of the visible appearance of their fit 
and supple bodies.  Breath is invisible beside what our eyes can see.  People with 
breathlessness for other reasons are invisible as individuals in our society and their story is 
told largely through the perspective of health.  Multiple reports attest to their contribution 
to mortality figures, hospital admissions, winter bed crises (BLF, 2017) and costs to health 
services.  It is unsurprising that the shame and lack of agency felt by people with lung 
disease is compounded by a public health narrative that is powerful by virtue of health’s 
inherent cultural and moral dominance, and an absence – not just invisibility – of other 
narratives.  In the next section I will establish the paucity of language in western accounts of 
breathlessness, and even breath itself, and also discuss alternative narratives that have 
potential to contest this dominance. 
 
Breath in language and culture 
Sartre emphasises the critical importance of language in understanding the body as seen by 
others: 
 
Language by revealing to us abstractly the principle structures of our body-for-others 
(even though the existed body is ineffable) impels us to place our alleged mission 
wholly in the hands of the Other.  We resign ourselves to seeing ourselves through 
the Other’s eyes; this means that we attempt to learn our being through the 
revelations of language.  Thus there appears a whole system of verbal 
correspondence by which we cause our body to be designated for us as it is for the 
Other by utilizing these designations to denote our body as it is for us.  (Sartre, 
1958;2003, p. 377). 
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If this is the case, then the language of breath and breathlessness does not give us much 
support in ‘designating’ our body.  As part of our research programme on Life of Breath, we 
hosted what we called ‘Breath Lab’: a research conversation involving a group of people with 
breathlessness, their relatives and carers, clinicians and policy-makers discussing the 
language of breathlessness.  By hosting this event outside any clinical context we hoped to 
capture some words and phrases that were not determined by diagnostic patterns and 
norms.  The conclusion, however, was that that breathlessness was difficult to describe.  
One respondent commented on the fact that there are a range of words to convey the 
‘character’ of pain, such as ‘sharp’, ‘dull’, throbbing’, ‘burning’.  But when people are called 
upon to describe breathlessness it seems more difficult to objectify the sensation as 
something apart from the self which can spoken about.  Poetry written as part of a Writer in 
Residence programme we organised with a local ‘Breathe Easy’ support group revealed not 
only the problem of finding the words to express the experience of breathlessness, but also 
the lack of opportunity for such expression: 
 
Grab, grasp with gratitude 
this chance to speak. 
To say what? 
Can I do it? 
Can we do it? 
Do we have the courage? 
Do we have the language? 
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We have the thoughts. 
mostly hidden. 
But words? 
Denied, or rather not asked for 
over the millenia. 
 
 From A Chance, by Jill Gladstone (reproduced with permission from the author).   
 
 
The reason for this void in the language of breathlessness is partly related to its existential 
inexpressibility (Carel, 2016) and to the fact that there are few accounts of either breath or 
breathlessness in non-clinical spaces.  If we accord literary accounts in western cultures the 
role both of recording and constructing our understandings of lived experience, the absence 
of breath from such a record is remarkable.  Greek classical writers, widely regarded as the 
progenitors of many aspects of western thought, wrote extensively on breath.  Aristotle 
produced two treatises: On Respiration and On Breaths, and Plato’s cosmology as described 
in the Timeas has a long account of breathing.  Yet we lack scholarly commentaries on 
breath in this context.  Ideas about breath and its significance as the life force (pneuma) or 
vital spirit are also informed by religious texts, such as The Bible, in which God in the 
creation story creates man by breathing his breath into Adam.  Such ideas provide 
resonances about the centrality of breath to life that are picked up in Shakespeare’s plays.  
In A Winter’s Tale Leontes detects life in the stone statue of Hermione: ‘Still, methinks/There 
is an air comes from her.  What fine chisel/Could ever yet cut breath?’ (Shakespeare, 1951).   
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In the final scene of King Lear, the King calls for a mirror to detect breath on the lips of the 
dead Cordelia.  Yet there are no academic writings on the subject of breath in Shakespeare. 
 
Indeed, breath is a theme that few literary scholars have engaged with critically.  One 
exception is Davina Quinlivan’s book, the Place of Breath in Cinema (2012).  She is one of the 
few contemporary cultural theorists to recognise the importance of breath as a lens through 
which to examine culture and its societal impacts.  Her focus on film as an audiovisual 
medium enables her to identify harsh or heavy breathing (such as that of Darth Vader in Star 
Wars p. 5) as a stigmatised cinematic trope reflecting danger and fear.  Breath is most 
frequently to be found buried in other themes and dealt with tangentially through, for 
example, accounts of the air, such as Connor (2010) or Irigaray (1999); or miasmas or fogs, 
such as Corton (2015).  As the authors to a new book produced by Life of Breath on breath in 
literature suggested: ‘Perhaps because breath functions so easily as an aesthetic substrate, it 
has been difficult to say anything substantial about it, in itself.’ (Rose et al., 2018).  It seems 
that breath is present in writing on voice, life, spirit, soul and body, but, with the notable 
exception of Quinlivan, it is never quite the focus of full attention, except when absent or 
difficult, as in the clinical context.   
 
Anglophone literary culture, therefore, serves rather to compound shame and encourage 
invisibility for those who live with breathlessness.  Literary accounts focus on the 
atmosphere of fear created by the sound of harsh breathing, on the sense of foreboding 
induced by the concealing effects of foggy air, or on breath as a metaphor for the suffocating 
effects of oppression.  The themes of invisibility, concealment and shame overwhelm any 
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accounts of breath as the giver of life or as an essential attribute for human existential 
connection.   
 
Breath and articulating the body 
As a foundation for exploring the importance of breath in body studies,  I have illustrated 
how breath is invisible for the individual body, the social body, and the body politic, noting 
furthermore how breath’s absence from cultural accounts has led to an impoverished 
language of breath.  This absence and impoverishment enables me to argue for breath as an 
important but neglected focus for body studies in how it emphasises the importance of 
balance and integration in ways of understanding the lived body.   
 
Bruno Latour, in a previous issue of this journal, argues for the importance of ‘articulation’ as 
a way of having a body; of being alive: 
An inarticulate subject is someone who whatever the other says or acts always feels, 
acts and says the same thing […].  In contrast, an articulate subject is someone who 
learns to be affected by others – not by itself [italics in original].  There is nothing 
especially interesting, deep, profound, worthwhile in a subject ‘by itself’, […] – a 
subject only becomes interesting, deep, profound, worthwhile when it resonates 
with others, is effected, moved, put into motion by new entities whose differences 
are registered in new and unexpected ways.  (Latour, 2004, p219). 
 
Latour dismisses the dualism of mind and body and instead conceptualises the body as ‘an 
interface that becomes more and more describable as it learns to be affected by more and 
more elements.’ [Italics in original] (Latour 2004, p. 206).  What is on offer through this idea 
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of ‘articulation’ of a body in the world is a way of integrating all the interactions that make a 
body a living entity, including the measurement instruments of the clinic, the cultural 
metaphors of the arts, and – for breath -  existential idea of the presence of a higher being 
or soul. 
 
The problem that the example of breath makes clear is that clinical articulations dominate 
and define the lived experience of breathlessness.  This has amplified the often discussed 
divergence between objective measurement and subjective experience of illness (Carel, 
2018) which is often attributed to medicine’s reliance on technology.  Such technology can 
skew the being of a breathless body towards the inarticulate subject Latour describes, 
leading to invisibility and silence.  In this final section, therefore I wish to discuss how breath 
is articulated in the clinical context, and the consequences of this for people with 
breathlessness.  I will go on to demonstrate that by widening this articulation to involve the 
dynamic relations between interoceptive awareness and experience it may be possible to 
reanimate the body through offering new means of articulation. 
 
Breath articulated in the clinic  
The clinical context is marked by a drive to understand the mechanisms underlying sensation 
so that symptoms can be defined and labelled with a diagnosis (Johnson et al, 2015).  The 
story of breathlessness has been one told largely in the language of physiology.  Clinicians 
working in respiratory medicine have long been puzzled by the mismatch between 
measured lung function and experienced breathlessness (so called ‘symptom discordance’) 
(Herigstad et al., 2011).   Recent clinical updates on breathlessness acknowledge that the 
experience ‘derives from interaction among multiple physiological, psychological, social and 
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environmental factors, and may induce secondary physiological and behavioral responses.’ 
(American Thoracic Society, 2012).  The clinical response to understanding the interactions 
between these factors is to turn to the brain.  The new neuroscience of breath is starting to 
model this complexity thus bringing further insights into the discordance between 
mechanisms and the lived experience of symptoms.   
 
Lansing, Gracely, and Banzett in a landmark paper in 2009 propose a multidimensional 
model taking its lead from pain studies (Lansing et al, 2009).   Using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) they describe three distinct ‘separable qualities’ of uncomfortable 
breathing: ‘air hunger’, ‘the work of breathing, and ‘tightness’.  Having described these 
sensory qualities and linked them to distinct physiological mechanisms, the authors move to 
the affective qualities of breathlessness distinguishing between sensory intensity (SI) and 
affective intensity (A1) or unpleasantness.  They further distinguish immediate experience of 
unpleasantness (A1) and a subsequent stage of cognitive evaluation and emotional response 
(A2).  This later stage mirrors the model of chronic pain where (as with chronic 
breathlessness) negative emotions such as depression, anxiety and fear are common 
consequences.   
 
There are, however, a number of problems with this model that obfuscate the lived 
experience of breathlessness.  First, the authors connect people’s ‘incommunicable’ sensory 
experience to physiological mechanisms by offering word or phrase descriptors to their 
subjects and asking them to choose the best fit.  As I have already noted, breathlessness is 
notoriously difficult to describe.  This method is, therefore, very likely to be highly 
suggestible to patients and it may also lead to a narrow range of descriptors making it easier 
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to ally them to discrete mechanisms or indeed to the researchers’ three ‘separable 
qualities’.  In addition, as Hardie et al. (2000) have demonstrated, the language used by 
different ethnic groups may differ even when apparently describing the same sensation.  
When asked about this the authors acknowledged that their experimental subjects tended 
to be young, white college students (personal communication).   What is also striking about 
Lansing’s model is that the A2 emotional response is proposed as deriving from the sensation 
of breathlessness.  But what seems clear is that the way people feel about their chronic 
breathlessness profoundly colours how the sensation is perceived (Hayen et al, 2013).  The 
problem with this articulation is that clinical experiments are largely carried out on normal 
subjects whose bodies and minds have not be subjected to years of chronic breathlessness, 
and its consequent dynamic effects on physiology and neural mechanisms.  Real patient 
studies are required, but those patient studies are challenging for people whose condition 
does not enable them to spend time lying flat in the enclosed tunnel of an MRI scanner. 
 
This example illustrates the powerful influence clinical culture has not only in determining 
the language and metaphors of breathlessness, such as ‘air hunger’, but also how the drive 
to atomise sensory mechanisms through the use of apparently objective imaging 
technologies such as fMRI can further obscure the lived experience and sensation of 
breathlessness.  Braun reveals the racial politics of the spirometer, another key machine for 
measuring breathlessness (Braun, 2014), and Dumit (2014) notes how PET (positron 
emission tomography) scans of the brain have become shorthand for different kinds of 
person: ‘normal, schizo, depressed’ (p.  6).  Our western cultural obsession with the image 
tends to fix bodies in time and space suspended in a web of sometimes suspect clinical 
assumptions.   
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If we move away from the static images that confine the lived body within the parameters of 
what clinical technology might objectively describe, but which are unable to take into 
account the dynamic interplay between body, mind and experience, we can start to 
understand the origins of so-called ‘symptom discordance’ in breathlessness.  As Leder says, 
‘in the West, the body (even the body interior) is largely thematized qua external objects, 
that thing which can be opened on the pathologist’s table or imaged through magnetic 
resonance imagery (MRI)’ (Leder, 2019, P. 314).  Leder, like Latour, also acknowledges the 
importance of this ‘third person’ perspective (Leder, 1990, p. 7): the body as ‘experiencer 
and experienced’ (Leder, 2019, p. 307).  The subject of breath and the experience of 
breathing, however, enable a deeper exploration of the body as experiencer through a focus 
on interoceptive awareness, which has recently become a key field of interest for both 
scientists and philosophers (Tsakiris and De Preester, 2019).   
 
In this final section I will now return to the initial theme of this paper – that of the sensing  
body.  The example of breath indicates how that invisible body-self might be more 
effectively articulated through an examination of interoceptive awareness.  This concept 
enables exploration of the complex relationship between subjective and objective body-self 
and also points to the dynamic potential for bodies (even sick bodies) to change and 
develop.   
 
Breath articulated from the inside: interoceptive awareness 
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Recognisng the importance of affect and cognition, there is now a move in neuroscience to 
take the dynamic relationship between body, brain and world into account.  This is clearly 
exemplified in the case of breathlessness, as Hayen et al acknowledge: 
Replicating the emotional component of dyspnea [breathlessness] in a laboratory 
environment is difficult as laboratory dyspnea does not cause the existential fears 
dyspnea sufferers encounter in daily life, hence patient studies will be necessary in 
order fully to comprehend all aspects of dyspnea.’ (Hayen, Herigstad and Pattinson, 
2013).   
In the clinical context, however, this ‘emotional component’ tends to become reduced to 
‘anxiety and depression’ (American Thoracic Society, 2012, p. 437) because these are 
recognised aspects of chronic disease for which a range of validated clinical measuring 
instruments have been developed.  The high prevalence of anxiety and depression in people 
with chronic breathlessness has also been associated with poor interoceptive awareness 
(Garfinkel, et al., 2016).   
 
For those with breathing problems, breathlessness is a constant and unwelcome 
accompaniment to life, and exercise – which makes it worse - is on the whole to be avoided.  
Oxley’s work on Life of Breath has revealed that many with breathlessness seek ‘safe spaces’ 
where they are not called upon to challenge themselves with movement.  One respondent 
said: 
“Where am I most comfortable?  In my chair. [laughing, coughing] – I’m not happy 
when I’m not in my chair.  Then I’m just puffing and wheezing.” 
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that those with chronic breathlessness have 
poor interoception.  The body is a burden best ignored, and staying inactive, in order not to 
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notice it, the optimal state of being.  This tendency, along with the dampening effect of 
emotional states, is likely to contribute to the problem of symptom discordance in 
breathlessness (Van den Berg et al, 2019, p. 213). 
 
This ‘problem’ of discordance arises because the fully articulated ‘lived body’ is not 
acknowledged in clinical contexts.  What both Leder, in his characterisation of the ‘lived 
body’, and Latour in his focus on ‘articulation’, assert is the critical importance of first and 
third person subjective and objective perceptions of the body in order fully to realise the 
body-self.  It is here, I think, at the point of articulation of these distinct perspectives, that 
the sensory modality of interoception can help act as an explanatory mechanism for why 
these perceptions act in different ways, and also mediate between them. 
 
Three dimensions of interoception have been identified as ‘distinct and disociable’ in 
neuropsychological terms (Garfinkel et al, 2015).  These dimensions are interoceptive 
accuracy, sensitivity and awareness.  These mean, respectively, a measurable ability to 
detect (for example) your own heartbeats; the self-evaluaton of your own ability to do so, 
and a ‘metacognative’ ability to gauge and judge your own awareness.  These different 
dimensions appear to drive a wedge between the two perspectives of the subjective lived 
body and the objectively assessed body in the context of the clinic.  The notion that there is 
an ‘accurate’ or ‘inaccurate’ way to perceive your own bodily sensations seems not to make 
sense.  However, this apparent lack of articulation enables us to rethink the idea of how 
bodily symptoms are assessed.   
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Van den Bergh and colleagues reflect upon the idea of accuracy in relation to symptoms 
(Van den Bergh et al, 2019).  They note that in the clinical context the idea of symptom 
assessment and consequent diagnosis depends upon the idea of accuracy.  The assumption 
is that patients report symptoms that are the direct effect of some physiological dysfunction 
detectable through clinical tests or imaging.  The ‘assumption’ here is that the patient’s 
interoceptive awareness is accurate and represents a true assessment of the underlying 
pathophysiology.  Symptoms themselves are rarely the focus of clinical interest, only what 
they apparently have to say about the physical state of the body.  Van den Bergh suggests 
that this ‘accuracy assumption’ represents a ‘fundamental implicit contract among the 
patient, the physician, and the healthcare system’ (Van den Bergh, 2019, p. 213).  However 
this only works under circumstances when the relationship between physiological stimulus 
and perceived symptom is simple.  In the context of chronic, multisystem conditions, with 
complex sets of stimuli across a range of bodily systems (like breathlessness) the relationship 
tends to break down, giving rise to so called ‘discordance’.  However, when we relate 
symptom and clinical assessment in a different way, such as by assessing a person’s 
perceived (i.e. interoceptive sensitivity to) breathlessness in relation to risk of dying, we get 
a different story.  It turns out that the perception of breathlessness is a better predictor of 
mortality than objectively measured breathlessness (Nishimura, et al, 2002).  This suggests 
that the coming together or, (in Latour’s sense) articulation, of physiological state with social 
life, past history, emotion and cognition are critical to prognosis in relation to complex 
symptoms like breathlessness.  How you feel about it, how it has affected your life overall, 
what impact it has had, are as important as how well your body is objectively functioning.  
As Noga Arikha has it: ‘interoception lies at the core of our very sense of self: physiology and 
mental life are dynamically coupled’ (Arikha, Aeon Essays, p. 3).   
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The critical term here is ‘dynamically’.  This aligns with the phenomenological sense that that 
our minds and bodies are in continual interaction with the ways in which the individual 
experiences life.  For the anthropologist, Mark Nichter, ‘embodiment is a dynamic process’ 
wherein past, present and future experiences are in active interplay with how bodily 
sensations are perceived at any one time (Nichter, 2008).  Tim Ingold speaks not of human 
beings but of human ‘becomings – that is not as discrete pre-formed entities but as 
trajectories of movement and growth’ (Ingold, 2013, p. 8).  Entangling these ideas with 
recent theories about how the brain works through the Predictive Coding hypothesis, it is 
also clear that neuroscience proposes a dynamic relation between mind, body and time 
(Knill and Pougett, 2004).  Predictive coding suggests that in order to deal with the 
complexity of living in a world of sensory uncertainty, we make predictions about sensory 
information on the basis of previous experience (unconscious ‘priors’).  These predictions 
are unconsciously generated but enable us to infer how we will perceive sensory stimuli 
without having to compute the full range of information coming into our brains.  
Unconscious prior experience may be embedded in our brains along with conscious habits of 
thought, and responses may be established over years of living with a symptom like chronic 
breathlessness, but the very fact that they are established in this dynamic way, through 
interaction between body and world, means they are not set in stone.    
 
What a study of breath brings here then is an ability to articulate objective scientific and 
subjective views of the lived body through the medium of interoceptive awareness.  As I said 
at the outset, breath is under both conscious and unconscious control: we can control our 
breathing though our brain may override this control if the body is at risk.  Breath is 
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therefore partly of the ‘recessive’ body, traditionally the preserve of bioscience to describe, 
but at the same time of the body as experienced and described subjectively.  This means 
that breath is a unique sensation and function that can demonstrate how apparently 
disparate fields of understanding of the lived body come together.  Those fields include 
those understood through subjective understanding, through the media of qualitative 
examination, and through cultural expression; and also the lived body understood 
objectively through clinical, neurophysiological analysis, and through neuroscientific theory.  
From these very different standpoints both agree that the lived body is a dynamic entity, 
shaped by the past and open to new articulation through future experience.   
 
Through this articulation it is possible to see how symptom discordance arises if there is, as 
in the clinic, a focus on objective means of measuring breath.  The dynamic potential of the 
lived body signaled through both objective and subjective views suggests that there is the 
possibility for change and positive adaptation to the subjective condition of breathlessness 
through the medium of interoceptive awareness.  This sense of potential can provide hope 
for those suffering from breathlessness who may feel neglected and lost.  Leder talks of 
gaining, or recovering, ‘inside insight’, arguing that greater awareness of the internal 
sensations of the body might divert us from actions that endanger health (Leder, 2019, p. 
318).  One approach that has found some efficacy in achieving this reconnection is dance 
(Keir et al, 2019).  Dance movement has the potential to reconnect the breathless person 
with their body in ways that may allow the body to be experienced as expressive, and as 
aesthetically valued, rather than as a burden to be ignored.  Interoceptive awareness - which 
is continually shaped and interpreted, consciously and subconsciously, by life experience 
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including culture, imagination, social relations and religious belief – might help regain a 
sense of control over the uncontrollable and terrifying experience of breathlessness.  
 
Conclusion: laying breath bare 
This article has described the range of ways and contexts in which breath is hidden to 
individual bodies, for social bodies and the body politic.  It has done so by looking at how 
breath is expressed in language and represented in clinical cultures and technologies.  I have 
illustrated the potential harm this poses to those whose lives are afflicted by breathlessness, 
through the cultures of public health and clinical science, both of which tend further to 
obscure the lived experience of breathlessness.  I have illustrated the absence of alternative 
accounts of breath and suggested that healthcare-related narratives have occupied this void 
providing society with the words and accepted explanations for how breath is understood 
and experienced.   
 
Breath, as both a component of the ‘recessive’ body and the body under conscious control is 
a unique lens through which to examine the intimate and dynamic interrelation of body and 
experience.  Breath is perceived through interoceptive awareness, and that perception is in 
turn profoundly influenced by concurrent emotional and pathological states, such as anxiety 
and depression, common accompaniments to chronic breathlessness.  Breathlessness is a 
key bodily symptom that demonstrates how clinical measurement can often be odds with 
experience.  A focus on interoceptive awareness enables us to make sense of this 
discordance as it signals the dynamic inter-relations of the body and world which constitute 
the lived body, and which bring together subjective and objective views of the body in 
neuroscience and anthropology.  Moreover, from a clinical perspective, these insights 
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demonstrate the potential for change and development in ways that might actually help 
people with the lived experience of breathlessness come out into the open and find new 
ways of articulating with the world through language and movement.  Critical medical 
humanities projects like Life of Breath, that not only seek to explore the experience of 
breathlessness in contexts outwith the clinical but also to entangle these literary, 
phenomenological and ethnographic explorations with clinical science, hold promise.   
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